is public knowledge of the situation unfavorable Retirement and Pension Fund Bank - or rather the bankruptcy -.
is proposed to include new contributors to such Bank Fund, who today are contributing to Social Security Bank and many of which are also found in the AFAP regime. Our intention is to make clear the harm that such action would cause serious candidates who happen to contribute to the Bank Fund, which would force us to leave our current system of contributions, so mandatory and without us involved. So we express the following:
A) Value Assets / Liabilities. CJPB currently has a ratio of passive versus active members of 0.74, meaning there is less of an active worker for every retiree is considered acceptable when such ratio is 3 to 1 (as for example the situation of the Fund of University Professionals). The latest
Wages Councils bank minimum wage is $ 19,104 and the average minimum wage of the groups "Credit Cards", "Credit Managers," Transportation of Values \u200b\u200b"is $ 7,733.
Based on this relationship, the possible 4,500 new contributors to the financial system proposed for transition to the Banking Cash, 1,822 contributors amount to the same level of input from the current bank, bringing the asset liability ratio would become 0.85.
clearly see that the inclusion of the equivalent of 1,822 new members to pay bank does not solve anything in the situation of CJPB, but would be simply a measure to stop complying with the various stakeholders mentioned above.
B) Comparison between the two systems. The proposal made by the Executive makes clear the Bank Fund offers us worse off compared to the current general retirement system and AFAP, namely
· provide personal: Those who move to bring to the Bank Fund, would the same level of contributions from 15% of their income as it is in the current regime. But must make the following points:
1. AEBU conducted a feasibility analysis CJPB where we included a percentage of contributions of 15% using invalid assumptions: a) life expectancy of the bank equal to general mortality tables, when in fact they are significantly higher in the bank and b) does not clarify the relationship of asset substitution, ie, when they actually retire no new workers who replaced the former, but on the contrary, this ratio is declining year by year as they have expressed all the actors who have spoken on this subject.
Therefore, to study the feasibility of the Fund through an analysis that is valid for the use of false assumptions, clearly notes that this level of contributions it will remain viable.
2. Pursuant to Article 5 of Law 16,565 in stating that the Council Honorary CJPB by unanimous vote may set employer contribution rates and staff, and as mentioned in the previous point, it is likely that we increase the level of contributions as part of an analysis is in fact reveals that the Fund is not viable for the levels of contributions from the general scheme.
Additionally, consider that the current system of AFAP there is a ceiling above which the worker if your income exceeds the same, now does not provide even 15% on Bank Fund would switch to always provide 100% of income.
· replacement rate, replacement rate is called the percentage of retirement to receive the salary divided at retirement. The proposal of the Executive set up a replacement rate of 50% additional for each year in excess of 35 years of service and age 60, according to Article 29 of Law No. 16,713.
BPS AFAP gives each retirement simulator so that there is a unique market approach, adjusted to reality, and reasonable projections of actuarial variables. Using BPS said tool (available at various Web of AFAP) to simulate the retirement of the salaries mentioned above, it is noted that replacement rates contributing to the BPS and AFAP are significantly higher than the rate of replacement of the CJPB.
For example, taking a 25 years with a salary of $ 19,104 (or more than $ 17,156) and therefore both BPS and contributor to AFAP, the replacement rate will be higher than the proposal for the Fund Banking, reaching in this case 60%.
SIST.DE BPS + AFAP
RETIREMENT AGES 25 YEARS is proposed to include new contributors to such Bank Fund, who today are contributing to Social Security Bank and many of which are also found in the AFAP regime. Our intention is to make clear the harm that such action would cause serious candidates who happen to contribute to the Bank Fund, which would force us to leave our current system of contributions, so mandatory and without us involved. So we express the following:
A) Value Assets / Liabilities. CJPB currently has a ratio of passive versus active members of 0.74, meaning there is less of an active worker for every retiree is considered acceptable when such ratio is 3 to 1 (as for example the situation of the Fund of University Professionals). The latest
Wages Councils bank minimum wage is $ 19,104 and the average minimum wage of the groups "Credit Cards", "Credit Managers," Transportation of Values \u200b\u200b"is $ 7,733.
Based on this relationship, the possible 4,500 new contributors to the financial system proposed for transition to the Banking Cash, 1,822 contributors amount to the same level of input from the current bank, bringing the asset liability ratio would become 0.85.
clearly see that the inclusion of the equivalent of 1,822 new members to pay bank does not solve anything in the situation of CJPB, but would be simply a measure to stop complying with the various stakeholders mentioned above.
B) Comparison between the two systems. The proposal made by the Executive makes clear the Bank Fund offers us worse off compared to the current general retirement system and AFAP, namely
· provide personal: Those who move to bring to the Bank Fund, would the same level of contributions from 15% of their income as it is in the current regime. But must make the following points:
1. AEBU conducted a feasibility analysis CJPB where we included a percentage of contributions of 15% using invalid assumptions: a) life expectancy of the bank equal to general mortality tables, when in fact they are significantly higher in the bank and b) does not clarify the relationship of asset substitution, ie, when they actually retire no new workers who replaced the former, but on the contrary, this ratio is declining year by year as they have expressed all the actors who have spoken on this subject.
Therefore, to study the feasibility of the Fund through an analysis that is valid for the use of false assumptions, clearly notes that this level of contributions it will remain viable.
2. Pursuant to Article 5 of Law 16,565 in stating that the Council Honorary CJPB by unanimous vote may set employer contribution rates and staff, and as mentioned in the previous point, it is likely that we increase the level of contributions as part of an analysis is in fact reveals that the Fund is not viable for the levels of contributions from the general scheme.
Additionally, consider that the current system of AFAP there is a ceiling above which the worker if your income exceeds the same, now does not provide even 15% on Bank Fund would switch to always provide 100% of income.
· replacement rate, replacement rate is called the percentage of retirement to receive the salary divided at retirement. The proposal of the Executive set up a replacement rate of 50% additional for each year in excess of 35 years of service and age 60, according to Article 29 of Law No. 16,713.
BPS AFAP gives each retirement simulator so that there is a unique market approach, adjusted to reality, and reasonable projections of actuarial variables. Using BPS said tool (available at various Web of AFAP) to simulate the retirement of the salaries mentioned above, it is noted that replacement rates contributing to the BPS and AFAP are significantly higher than the rate of replacement of the CJPB.
For example, taking a 25 years with a salary of $ 19,104 (or more than $ 17,156) and therefore both BPS and contributor to AFAP, the replacement rate will be higher than the proposal for the Fund Banking, reaching in this case 60%.
SIST.DE BPS + AFAP
SDO.NOMINAL $ u
RETIREMENT 19,104 (1) $ u
17,182 60% RATE REPLACEMENT REPLACEMENT RATE
CJPB
51.5% (1) Retirement age: 60 years
For the particular case of officials of OCA SA , 80% of total retiree for the current regime of BPS and Afap with a replacement rate of 69% at 60 years of age.
· Calculation of retirement to receive: As proposed by P. Executive CJPB be considered in the best position among the 20 years of major contributions, or the last 10 years.
prejudice is clearly a to no longer own Afap personal accounts as the amount to be received through the AFAP regime is directly linked to what made considering all the years of contributions.
· stops retirement: In the above proposal indicates that maintaining the current cap CJPB.
51.5% (1) Retirement age: 60 years
For the particular case of officials of OCA SA , 80% of total retiree for the current regime of BPS and Afap with a replacement rate of 69% at 60 years of age.
· Calculation of retirement to receive: As proposed by P. Executive CJPB be considered in the best position among the 20 years of major contributions, or the last 10 years.
prejudice is clearly a to no longer own Afap personal accounts as the amount to be received through the AFAP regime is directly linked to what made considering all the years of contributions.
· stops retirement: In the above proposal indicates that maintaining the current cap CJPB.
Removing the Afap, the benefit of being able to add the maximum amount of retirement BPS ($ 14,068) the retirement Afap, which has no cap is removed with the passage to the Bank Fund where there are stops according to number of years of contributions to that Fund.
This entails that, unlike the BPS + Afap system in CJPB no incentive to keep work after 60 years in pursuit of a better retirement for 2 reasons: a) if retirement is limited by any of the stops CJPB system, for more years to continue working to retirement will not grow or there to work many more years for the purpose of power to the next intermediate stop, b) even in the cases that were not affected by caps of the Fund, increased by more years of work over 60 years is higher for Afap BPS contributors and contributors that the Bank Fund.
C) Conclusions. All this picture shows that the proposal for the conditions and parameters CJPB presents unfavorable actuarial the general retirement system.
We will not repeat what happened in August 1994 when it created the Law No. 16,565 for a mandatory increase in the number of contributors to the Bank Fund Cias forcing. Insurance to make his scheme to move to make contributions to that Fund. During the first 2 years they maintained the same level of contributions, then move to bring the percentage of bank contributions (over inputs) including the tax on bank liabilities created to solve the CJPB (Law No. 17,841). Today, 14 years later, the Bank Fund in the worst economic and financial situation at the time of raising that afiliatorio field.
We do not want to repeat history with us, and even more so knowing that in 10 years, retiring on 27% of banking assets in 15 years would be retired for 54% of banking assets and 20 years for 72% of them ( retirees would be 3,378, 6,859 and 9,102 respectively banking assets of 12,707 there today).
( http://www.cjpb.org.uy/Publicador/Actuaria/Activos/Activos_Total_Edad.htm )
That is why we see no sense that we can engage in a new adventure, where today it we are in a formal system.
And if we were forcibly included (a fact that is not fair at all), at least pretend that we respect or enhance our existing rights.
Given this situation, we ask ourselves why we want to make a mandatory part of a business that is blown?, Why we want to move to a better regime to another worse, with greater contributions, worse conditions and lower rates replacement?, and finally, if we can maintain our current conditions and rights acquired, why not let us choose?
This entails that, unlike the BPS + Afap system in CJPB no incentive to keep work after 60 years in pursuit of a better retirement for 2 reasons: a) if retirement is limited by any of the stops CJPB system, for more years to continue working to retirement will not grow or there to work many more years for the purpose of power to the next intermediate stop, b) even in the cases that were not affected by caps of the Fund, increased by more years of work over 60 years is higher for Afap BPS contributors and contributors that the Bank Fund.
C) Conclusions. All this picture shows that the proposal for the conditions and parameters CJPB presents unfavorable actuarial the general retirement system.
We will not repeat what happened in August 1994 when it created the Law No. 16,565 for a mandatory increase in the number of contributors to the Bank Fund Cias forcing. Insurance to make his scheme to move to make contributions to that Fund. During the first 2 years they maintained the same level of contributions, then move to bring the percentage of bank contributions (over inputs) including the tax on bank liabilities created to solve the CJPB (Law No. 17,841). Today, 14 years later, the Bank Fund in the worst economic and financial situation at the time of raising that afiliatorio field.
We do not want to repeat history with us, and even more so knowing that in 10 years, retiring on 27% of banking assets in 15 years would be retired for 54% of banking assets and 20 years for 72% of them ( retirees would be 3,378, 6,859 and 9,102 respectively banking assets of 12,707 there today).
( http://www.cjpb.org.uy/Publicador/Actuaria/Activos/Activos_Total_Edad.htm )
That is why we see no sense that we can engage in a new adventure, where today it we are in a formal system.
And if we were forcibly included (a fact that is not fair at all), at least pretend that we respect or enhance our existing rights.
Given this situation, we ask ourselves why we want to make a mandatory part of a business that is blown?, Why we want to move to a better regime to another worse, with greater contributions, worse conditions and lower rates replacement?, and finally, if we can maintain our current conditions and rights acquired, why not let us choose?
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